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pressions are somewhat blurred; and the book serves more adequately as a storehouse of specialized facts in military history than as a finished study of the significance of these facts. In gathering this material, however, and in subjecting it to partial analysis, Mr. Pratt has rendered a valuable service. He has brought together, from a large number and variety of sources, primary and secondary, a mass of material that throws light upon the past military history of the leading nations, and which will serve as a substantial starting-point for the future study of a very important aspect of the present world struggle. This book constitutes the most comprehensive general treatment yet available of the rise of rail-power as an instrument of warfare.

I. LEO SHARFMAN.

General Botha: the Career and the Man. By HAROLD SPENDER.
(Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 1916.
Pp. 348. \$2.50.)

THIS is a biography begotten of the war. Useful because the first narrative of Botha's career and because written by one who has known Botha and his friends for a long time, it is nevertheless not a significant addition to the literature of South African history. Mr. Spender has set out to make familiar to the public a man whose services to the British Empire deserve fullest appreciation. He has handled a considerable body of sources, and he has evidently been given opportunities to consult with those public men who have had to do with South Africa, opportunities that should give his work authority. Yet there are indications of hurry and carelessness which impair the value of the book. That part of the biography which I have been able to test by the sources, the part dealing with the South African War and the events immediately following, contains slight inaccuracies and misstatements, most of them the result less of a want of knowledge than of pains. The worst slip is the confusion of the battle of Diamond Hill with that of Berg-en-dal.

The author is too sketchy. Never economical of words, he wants space, nevertheless, to tell us what we would like to know most. Botha's schemes of attack, his gift of holding Boer soldiers, each inclined to go his own way, to one purpose, and of organizing stubborn retreats—such matters he fails to bring into clear relief. The story of Spion Kop is so told that we miss essential and characteristic features. Botha's most signal victories he owed as much to the stupidity of his adversaries as to his own strategy, a fact Mr. Spender blinks. He also fails to recognize Botha's mistakes and indiscretions. The reader might suppose that Botha's military conclusions had never been at fault; he is told nothing of Botha's errors in judgment on his European mission after the war.

The latter part of the work seems to be much better. Certainly the narrative of events from 1906 to 1914 embodies much not so easily found

elsewhere. The author has used parliamentary reports, South African newspapers, memoirs, and private information to good effect. The story of Botha's work as premier of the Transvaal, of his part in shaping the Union, of his policies as premier of South Africa, of his handling of the Hertzog split and of the labor crisis, of his quick suppression of the rebellion of 1914, and of his swift invasion of German Southwest Africa is well told. The twistings and involutions of South African politics are straightened out in workmanlike fashion. It becomes easier to account for the Boer support of Britain in 1914. That support was the outcome of the policy of a man of great natural shrewdness and remarkable capacity for growth, who not only mastered in a few years the ins and outs of the English party system and the duties of party leadership, but also caught the conception of British imperialism. It may be that the author gives Botha more than his due, and it is probable that he has interpreted South African politics from the standpoint of a watcher at Westminster. He has drawn a great man, whose policy in the last two years is the finest tribute to imperialism—of the Liberal kind.

WALLACE NOTESTEIN.

Les Origines du Pangermanisme (1800 à 1888). Avec une Préface par CHARLES ANDLER, Professeur à l'Université de Paris. [Collection de Documents sur le Pangermanisme traduits de l'Allemand publiés sous la Direction de M. Charles Andler.] (Paris: Louis Conard. 1915. Pp. lviii, 335.)

Le Pangermanisme Continental sous Guillaume II. (de 1888 à 1914). By the same. (*Ibid.* 1915. Pp. lxxxiii, 480.)

Le Pangermanisme Colonial sous Guillaume II. (de 1888 à 1914). By the same. (*Ibid.* 1916. Pp. c, 335.)

Le Pangermanisme Philosophique (1800 à 1914). By the same (*Ibid.* 1917. Pp. clii, 398.) (25 frs. for the four vols.)

ONE of the immediate results of the war is the realization that the history of Austro-German statecraft and diplomacy since 1870 must be rewritten in the light of the war of 1914 and of Pan-Germanism. German history written for us by Germans—and it has dominated by mere weight of erudition the studies of foreign students—has been a defense, a justification, a background for the war of 1914 itself which would convince the German people and, if possible, other nations as well, of the justifiability and necessity of the war when it should be fought. It was however a history in which real aims and policies could not appear; it must create the essential foundations for a structure whose existence must be unsuspected until "the day" dawned. While it would be idle to deny that there is much truth in the history of Germany as German scholars have written it, and absurd to suppose that the overwhelming